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Abstract
This study models competition between multinationals, sequentially entering the
same market, and analyzes how they choose their entry modes between trade, green-
field investment and acquisition, and how competition amongst them affects their
choices. I discuss two important factors that lead a multinational whether or not
to acquire a local firm: the intensity of pre- and post-acquisition competition. The
former determines both the acquisition price and the profitability of the next best
alternative entry mode, whereas the latter determines the extent of business steal-
ing by the rival. The results point to a non-linear relationship between trade and
investment liberalization and foreign direct investment.
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1 Introduction
It is well documented in the literature that (i) multinationals operate mostly in oligopolis-
tic markets, and (ii) they are significantly responsive to each other’s investment decisions;
see, for example, Caves (1996). However, most studies either consider a single investor’s
foreign market entry mode choice, or look at multiple investors in a non-strategic frame-
work. This study contributes to the literature by modeling competition between multi-
nationals entering the same market, and by scrutinizing how they strategically interact
and choose their entry modes between trade, greenfield investment and acquisition. I
highlight two important factors that lead a multinational whether or not to acquire a
local firm: the intensity of pre- and post-acquisition competition. The former determines
both the acquisition price and the profitability of the next best alternative entry mode,
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whereas the latter determines the extent of business stealing by the rival. Acquisition
reduces competition in the product market and enables the rival to steal business from
the acquiring firm via trade or horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI).1 In particular,
the results point to a non-linear relationship between trade (or investment) liberalization
and FDI, which is consistent with the evidence that economic liberalization in the 1990s
did not slow down FDI, while increasing world trade. In studies that assume away com-
petition between multinationals, however, FDI is expected to decrease with a decrease in
trade costs, which contradicts the FDI trends in the 1990s.
The empirical motivation of this paper is that there is now a substantial number of multi-
national firms trying to exploit investment opportunities around the globe. Altomonte
and Rungi (2014), for instance, use a unique firm-level dataset that maps more than 270
thousand headquarters controlling more than 1.5 million affiliates in all industries across
some 200 countries in 2010. Of the total affiliates, approximately 30% are foreign affili-
ates, 70% of which are located in the OECD countries. The European Union countries
and the USA host 65% of the foreign affiliates worldwide. These numbers point to an
unequal distribution of FDI activities among the countries and imply that competition
between multinational firms - simultaneously or sequentially - entering the same mar-
ket is inevitable, especially in countries that are successful in attracting FDI. In such
countries, strategic interactions between multinationals become even more pronounced,
which warrants a game theoretic approach for the analysis of the optimal entry modes. I
consider a sequential foreign market entry game as it seems to be the common approach.2
In particular, empirical evidence suggests that (i) firms’ investment decisions are intrin-
sically related (Defever et al., 2014), and (ii) there is seemingly sequential entry pattern
of the firms that survive in global markets (Albornoz et al., 2012). Also it seems to be
natural to model firms’ investment decisions as being sequential, especially when irre-
1Empirical evidence suggests that horizontal FDI is still dominant. Therefore, throughout the paper,
I concentrate only on horizontal FDI, in which the main motivation is to serve consumers in a host
country.
2I have solved the model also for a simultaneous market entry game, but have not reported the results
as they are qualitatively similar to those of the sequential market entry game. Nevertheless, I discuss
some important implications of simultaneous entry by multinationals. The results of the simultaneous
market entry game are available upon request.
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versible investment/export costs are taken into account. Irreversible costs play a similar
role as irreversible commitment, and given that FDI projects do not remain secret and
require longer lead time as compared to trade, in markets where firms are potentially
large, and thus an industry is potentially concentrated, the observation of an investment
by a foreign firm will have an effect on the investment decision of other firms.
The traditional models of FDI focus on different market entry costs to explain why
firms may prefer FDI over exporting. According to the proximity-concentration trade
off, for example, FDI may be more profitable when economies of scale are large at the
firm level, and small at the plant level. The reason is that although it is very costly to
produce knowledge capital - intangible assets such as reputation, blue prints, brand name
- which generates firm-level scale economies, a firm can supply it to foreign production
facilities with almost no cost and without decreasing its value or productivity as long as
it stays within the firm.3 By contrast, a firm has to duplicate its production process when
undertaking FDI in a foreign country. If this is significantly costly, then the firm may
be better off by paying trade costs and exporting. By the same token, the tariff-jumping
hypothesis suggests that given sufficiently large market size - so that fixed investment
costs per sales are small - a firm may prefer undertaking FDI over exporting just to avoid
trade costs. That is, a multinational firm prefers to produce at home and export if locating
a subsidiary in a market is not as efficient (Neary, 2009). Similarly, a multinational firm
may opt to acquire an existing local firm if entry by establishing its own subsidiary in
the market, referred to as greenfield investment, is not as profitable. Go¨rg (2000) finds
that a foreign entrant favors acquiring a local firm over undertaking greenfield investment
unless additional (fixed) costs associated with greenfield investment are very low relative
to costs associated with acquisition (e.g., product and process adaptation costs).
Mu¨ller (2007) examines possible impacts of investment costs, technology differences - the
difference between firms’ marginal costs - market size, market structure and competition
3There is sufficient evidence that investors tend to have a preference for FDI (whole ownership) because
knowledge capital can be easily dissipated in a shared ownership; see Navaretti and Venables (2004).
To keep a tractable model, however, I abstract from such motives for FDI.
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intensity on a multinational firm’s entry mode choice in a model a` la Hotelling where
firms compete by prices. According to his finding, a higher cost of greenfield investment
makes acquisition more attractive, whereas if the investment cost is too large, acquisition
is not profitable and no entry is the optimal choice. The intuition is as follows. First, the
relative cost of acquiring a firm decreases when the cost of greenfield investment increases.
Second, if the investment cost increases sufficiently, greenfield investment is not profitable,
so it is not a credible threat; since there is no alternative entry option except acquisition
- Mu¨ller (2007) does not allow the multinational firm to export - the multinational firm
either acquires a firm or stays out of the market. Consequently, the acquisition price
increases and deters the multinational firm from entering the market. Mu¨ller (2007) also
shows that the multinational firm is better off by undertaking greenfield investment if the
technology difference is sufficiently large - if the rival is less efficient - or if the intensity of
product market competition is sufficiently high or sufficiently low, whereas, if the intensity
of competition is moderate, he finds that acquisition is the optimal entry mode. Eicher
and Kang (2005), by allowing for trade, show that the optimal entry mode is a function
of fixed costs, trade costs and market size, provided that competition is sufficiently weak
or product differentiation is strong. According to their finding, the multinational firm
always acquires a local firm in a sufficiently large market when trade is free and transport
costs are zero. The reason is that the multinational firm’s acquisition profit increases with
market size. If trade costs are low, a greenfield investment replaces trade for low fixed
costs insofar as low fixed investment costs decrease the multinational firm’s profit by less
than the efficiency loss due to trade costs. Once fixed costs reach high levels, they show
that a multinational firm chooses acquisition in a very large market, trade in a moderately
large market and no entry in a small market.
While there is a well-established literature looking at a single multinational’s foreign
market entry, few studies model competition between multinationals. Javorcik and Saggi
(2010) analyze two firms’ preferred entry modes when firms have different production
costs. They assume a single local firm and allow the two multinational firms to choose
between greenfield investment and a joint venture with the local firm. Their finding sug-
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gests that technologically advanced firms are more likely to prefer greenfield investment
to joint ventures. In their study, the local firm plays a quasi-passive role such that it is
not able to produce without venturing with a multinational firm, although it reduces its
partner’s marginal production cost and shares rents in a joint venture. Another study
that allows for competition between multinationals is Norba¨ck and Persson (2008) who
analyze multinationals’ choice between greenfield investment and acquisition. They ar-
gue that there may be fierce bidding competition over acquiring a local firm’s assets if
entry by acquisition provides a large market share. Consequently, the acquisition price
substantially increases and the acquirer’s ex-post profit may be less than the greenfield
profit. In their study, however, market entry by exporting is assumed away.
Mergers and acquisitions have been the driving force of international integration and
have increased substantially, especially in the post-deregulation era of the 1990s (e.g.,
see Andrade et al., 2001).4 Bjorvatn (2004) provides an explanation to the increase in
M&As also by modeling competition between multinationals. He shows that economic in-
tegration that reduces trade costs (or investment costs) may reduce the business-stealing
effect, and/or may reduce the cost of acquiring a firm by increasing the competitive pres-
sure on the firm, and hence by decreasing the firm’s reservation price. Bjorvatn (2004),
however, focuses only on the profitability of M&As, and overlooks the strategic interac-
tions that may lead to different entry mode choices of multinationals even when M&As
are profitable. The main goal of this study is thus to develop a better understanding
how strategic interactions lead firms to choose their foreign market entry modes and
how their choices relate to trade costs and investment costs. Unlike Bjorvatn (2004),
this study is able to show that economic integration does not necessarily lead to more
FDI. Investment liberalizations are warranted along with trade liberalizations (as was
the case in the post-deregulation era of the 1990s) in order to explain the increase in
FDI (greenfield investment and acquisitions) as compared to trade. If fixed investment
4As reported by Dunning and Lundan (2008: 20) and UNCTAD (2006: 16), in the period 1999-2001 and
since 2005, more than six thousand cross-border mergers and acquisitions were undertaken annually,
and over a hundred deals annually had a value exceeding US$ 1 billion. Between 1995 and 1997, the
share of M&As in World FDI was about 60%, and between 1998 and 2001, their share increased to 75%
(Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
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costs are reduced sufficiently, both multinationals prefer FDI, and for some levels of fixed
investment costs, firm acquisition by a multinational can trigger greenfield investment
by another multinational firm. This result is consistent with the observation that higher
mergers and acquisitions were typically followed by higher greenfield investment especially
in developed countries in the 1990s (see Caldero´n et al. 2004).
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. A simple model of foreign market
entry by a single multinational firm is introduced and solved for the optimal entry modes
in Section 2. The model is extended to two multinationals and is solved for the optimal
entry modes in Section 3. Section 4 discusses possible extensions of the model. Finally,
Section 5 concludes. For convenience, I have relegated the proofs and technical details to
the Appendix.
2 Foreign market entry by a single multinational
In this section, I introduce a canonical model to illustrate the results discussed above.
Consider a market which is served by one local firm, labeled 1. The local firm has paid a
fixed cost which allowed market entry in the past. It was a sunk cost. So the fixed cost
cannot be recovered by market exit. Let c denote the local firm’s marginal cost of pro-
duction, where c ∈ [0, 1]. Consumers in this market have quasi-linear preferences which
give rise to the inverse demand function, p = a − Q, where p denotes the equilibrium
price and Q is the aggregate supply. If entry to this market is not allowed, the local
firm will maintain its monopoly power and produce at the output level of (a− c) /2 and
earn the monopoly profit of (a− c)2 /4.5 Suppose that entry is allowed and a foreign
investor/multinational firm (MNF) - namely, MNF1 - is willing to enter this market. I
normalize MNF1’s production cost to zero. Hence, the foreign firm is technologically
5Firm 1 maximizes its profit, (a− q1 − c) q1, where q1 is firm 1’s output. The FOC, a − 2q1 − c = 0,
immediately specifies firm 1’s monopoly output in equilibrium such that q1 = (a− c) /2. By substituting
this optimal monopoly output into firm 1’s profit function, firm 1’s equilibrium monopoly profit can be
computed as (a− c)2 /4.
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superior.6 The foreign firm can choose its entry mode from three different options: ac-
quisition, greenfield investment or trade.7 I will model the acquisition similar to Salant
et al. (1983): the investor pays an acquisition price, denoted by Ω, to the local firm and
the local firm vanishes.8 There is no efficiency loss when the investor acquires the local
firm: MNF1 employs its more efficient technology (as in Barros, 1998).
If the foreign firm produces at home and ships the goods to this market, it will have to
pay additional costs (e.g., transport costs and tariffs), which I refer to as the per-unit
trade cost, and denote by t: the foreign firm’s marginal cost will increase to t. The foreign
firm can save the per-unit trade cost by undertaking greenfield investment. However, this
investment requires a fixed cost of setting up a subsidiary in the market. Let f denote
the fixed cost of undertaking greenfield investment. If the fixed investment cost is small
such that f < 4t(a + c − t)/9, the foreign firm will opt for greenfield investment as the
fixed greenfield cost reduces MNF1’s profit by less than the efficiency loss due to trade.
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If, however, the fixed greenfield cost is large such that f > 4t(a+ c− t)/9, MNF1 prefers
trade to greenfield investment so long as trade yields positive profits. If the per-unit
trade cost is sufficiently high such that t > (a+ c) /2 - if MNF1’s trade profit is negative
- then MNF1 prefers to stay out of this market unless the fixed greenfield cost allows for
a positive greenfield profit (i.e., f < (a+ c)2 /9); see Appendix A.1.1 for details. Figure 1
illustrates these results for the fixed greenfield cost f and the per-unit trade cost t ∈ [0, 1],
given market size a = 1 and the local firm’s marginal cost c = 0. Clearly, reducing the
6This normalization is merely a simplification of the common observation in most countries where multi-
nationals are actively operating: local firms possess a less efficient production technology compared to
multinationals; see Mu¨ller (2007) and Navaretti and Venables (2004).
7If none of the entry modes yields non-negative profits in equilibrium, MNF1 will prefer to stay out of
the market.
8Also I will assume that there is no additional cost of acquiring a local firm. The acquisition price
constitutes the sole cost of acquiring the local firm. Note that this is in fact an assumption which
normalizes fixed costs of acquiring a firm (i.e., product and process adaptation costs etc.) to zero.
So, fixed greenfield costs should be interpreted relative to fixed acquisition costs. The results of the
model would not have changed if I had explicitly introduced additional costs of acquisition (i.e., fixed
acquisition costs) in the model.
9I shall assume that the market is large enough to accommodate two firms (i.e., a < 2c), so that there
is no crowding out. MNF1 prefers greenfield investment to trade if its greenfield profit, (a + c)
2/9− f,
is more than its trade profit, (a+ c− 2t)2/9, which is the case when f < 4t(a+ c− t)/9, provided that
both entry modes yield positive profits in equilibrium. See Appendix A.1.1 for details. The extension
to the n-MNF case is straightforward. See Appendix A.1.2 for details.
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Figure 1 Trade vs Greenfield Investment (Duopoly).
per-unit trade cost encourages MNF1 to export so long as the fixed greenfield cost is not
sufficiently low such that it permits greenfield investment as a solution.10
The acquisition of the local firm, giving the multinational monopoly power, earns the
multinational larger profits: the acquisition profit, a2/4−Ω, is more than both the trade
profit, (a− 2t+ c)2 /9, and the greenfield profit, [(a+ c)2 /9] − f.11 Moreover, if the
local firm is sufficiently less efficient than the multinational, then merging to monopoly
is always more profitable, even when the local firm has complete bargaining power.12
10For a similar discussion of a single multinational’s optimal market entry mode, see Neary (2009).
11The acquisition price, Ω, is determined by the multinational’s take-it-or-leave-it offer to the local firm.
The multinational offers the local firm the outside profit - the local firm’s profit if it rejects the offer -
so as to make the local firm indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer. Ω = (a− 2c)2 /9 if
f < 4t(a+ c− t)/9, or Ω = (a− 2c + t)2 /9 if f > 4t(a+ c− t)/9. If t > (a + c) /2 and f > (a + c)2 /9,
the local firm will not accept any offer less than its monopoly profit (a− c)2 /4.
12The IO literature on mergers and acquisitions shows that a merger is profitable if it includes at least
80 per cent of the total number of firms in the market (e.g., merging to monopoly) so that there is no
substantial business stealing by the firms that do not participate in the merger. In particular, firms may
benefit from a merger, provided sufficient efficiency gains are generated as in Perry and Porter (1985).
If, however, there is linear demand and no efficiency gains, firms may not benefit from a merger if they
compete in a market of strategic substitutes in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985);
see, for example, Stigler (1950), Salant et al. (1983), and Farrell and Shapiro (1990). This merger
paradox may be avoided when there is no cost reductions, but convex demand as in Hennessy (2000),
or when products are differentiated as in Lommerud and Sorgard (1997), and when firms compete in
a market of strategic complements as in Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
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3 Optimal entry modes under competition
Suppose now that there is another foreign firm, intending to enter the market following
MNF1’s entry.
13 The presence of another firm willing to enter the same market will
influence MNF1’s optimal entry mode. Therefore, I will modify the above model and will
assume two multinational firms - namely, MNF1 and MNF2 - sequentially entering the
same market. For simplicity, I will assume that MNF1 and MNF2 are ex ante symmetric
in their marginal cost of production: they both possess a similar production technology,
and produce the homogeneous good with the same marginal cost, which is normalized to
zero.14 When all three firms are active in the market, the aggregate supply, Q, comprises
the MNFs’ outputs qm1 and qm2, and the local firm’s output q1.
The interaction between firms takes place such that MNF1 decides on its entry mode first.
MNF2 takes this decision as given, and, subsequent to MNF1’s decision, decides on its en-
try mode. Particularly, MNF1 makes an acquisition offer to the local firm in the first stage
of the game. It is a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If the local firm accepts MNF1’s acquisition
offer, MNF1 acquires the local firm. MNF2 observes the acquisition and, subsequently,
chooses its entry mode between trade and greenfield investment. Then, both multina-
tional firms compete against each other in the Cournot duopoly game. If MNF1 does
not acquire the local firm in the first stage, both multinational firms sequentially choose
their entry modes between trade and greenfield investment. Consequently, there will be
three firms competing a` la Cournot (i.e., the market will consist of two multinational
firms and one incumbent firm), provided that all firms choose to produce in equilibrium.
Multinationals do not enter the market if neither entry mode yields a non-negative profit.
The game is solved backwards for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
13I can also consider some domestic entrepreneurs observing profitable investment opportunities in this
market. However, I will implicitly assume, for simplicity, that multinationals hold intellectual property
(e.g., technology ownership through patents) which is necessary to create a new firm in this market;
see Mukherjee and Sengupta (2001) for discussions.
14Given the fact that most FDI originates from developed countries, and that the majority of FDI goes to
developed countries as well, the multinationals are expected to have access to and to possess a similar
production technology, especially when producing homogenous goods; see Navaretti and Venables
(2004) for discussions.
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3.1 Trade versus greenfield investment
Let pi
t(t)
m1 and pi
t(t)
m2 denote MNF1’s and MNF2’s profit, respectively, in the case that both
multinationals opt for trade. pi
t(t)
m1 and pi
t(t)
m2 are given by equation (1) (see Appendix A.1.3
for details):
pi
t(t)
m1 = pi
t(t)
m2 =
(
a+ c− 2t
4
)2
. (1)
The superscript t refers to trade, and the superscript in brackets represents the rival
firm’s entry mode. As is clear from equation (1) , the per-unit trade cost t represents the
efficiency loss due to trade. The higher the per-unit trade cost - the larger the efficiency
loss - the lower is the multinationals’ trade profit and the less is the competitive pressure
on the local firm.
Let pi
t(g)
m1 and pi
g(t)
m2 denote MNF1’s and MNF2’s profit, respectively, in the case that MNF1
chooses trade and MNF2 chooses greenfield investment. The superscript g refers to green-
field investment. Similarly, let pi
g(t)
m1 and pi
t(g)
m2 denote MNF1’s and MNF2’s profit, respec-
tively, in the case that MNF1 chooses greenfield investment and MNF2 chooses trade.
Equations (2) and (3) give the multinational firms’ profits,
(
pi
t(g)
m1 , pi
t(g)
m2
)
and
(
pi
g(t)
m1 , pi
g(t)
m2
)
,
respectively (see Appendix A.1.3 for details):
pi
t(g)
m1 = pi
t(g)
m2 =
(
a+ c− 3t
4
)2
, (2)
pi
g(t)
m1 = pi
g(t)
m2 =
(
a+ c+ t
4
)2
− f. (3)
Equations (2) and (3) clearly show that if an MNF chooses trade when the rival MNF
undertakes greenfield investment, the exporting firm’s profit decreases with the per-unit
trade cost (t), whereas the other MNF’s profit increases with t. The reason is that both
firms have downward-sloping reaction curves as they compete by quantities. Therefore,
when one firm reduces its output, the other firm will increase it. In equations (2) and (3),
the exporting firm reduces its output due to the efficiency loss - its profit decreases - so
the other firm increases its output - its profit increases - insofar as, in this situation, the
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greenfield investor has a competitive advantage over the exporting firm. The higher is the
per-unit trade cost, the larger is the competitive advantage that the greenfield investor
has over the exporting firm, so the higher is the greenfield investor’s profit.
If both multinational firms undertake greenfield investment, then they have the same
competitive position and earn the same profits, which decrease with the fixed greenfield
cost. I denote by pi
g(g)
m1 and pi
g(g)
m2 MNF1’s and MNF2’s profit, respectively, which are given
by equation (4) (see Appendix A.1.3 for details):
pi
g(g)
m1 = pi
g(g)
m2 =
(
a+ c
4
)2
− f. (4)
In the stage that the multinational firms sequentially choose their entry modes between
trade and greenfield investment, MNF1 chooses greenfield investment, irrespective of
MNF2’s choice, if (and only if) pi
g(t)
m1 > pi
t(t)
m1 and pi
g(g)
m1 > pi
t(g)
m1 . Subsequent to MNF1’s
entry mode choice, MNF2 decides on its entry mode between greenfield investment and
trade. MNF2 also chooses greenfield investment, irrespective of MNF1’s choice, if (and
only if) pi
g(t)
m2 > pi
t(t)
m2 and pi
g(g)
m2 > pi
t(g)
m2 . This leads to Remark 1.
Remark 1. Greenfield investment is the dominant strategy for both firms if (and only
if) f < fl = 3t(2a+ 2c− 3t)/16.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
It is straightforward to show that as the cost of serving the market through trade rises,
the maximum value of the fixed cost of investment that permits greenfield investment as
a solution increases. This is true also when the local firm is less efficient.
Trade can also be both firms’ dominant strategy. Both MNF1 and MNF2 opt for trade if
(and only if) pi
t(t)
m2
(
= pi
t(t)
m1
)
> pi
g(t)
m2
(
= pi
g(t)
m1
)
and pi
t(g)
m2
(
= pi
t(g)
m1
)
> pi
g(g)
m2
(
= pi
g(g)
m1
)
:
Remark 2. Trade is the dominant market entry strategy for both firms if (and only if)
f > fu = 3t(2a+ 2c− t)/16.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
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Clearly, if the cost of serving the market through trade is zero, it is always (never) a
dominant strategy to serve the market through trade (greenfield investment), provided
that the fixed greenfield cost is positive. As the cost of serving the market through trade
rises, the minimum value of the fixed cost of investment that permits trade as a solution
increases. Also the less efficient is the domestic firm - the higher is c - the larger is the
minimum value of the fixed cost of investment that permits trade as a dominant strategy.
It is also possible that MNF2 exports, when MNF1 undertakes greenfield investment in
equilibrium, which is the case if pi
g(t)
m2 > pi
t(t)
m2 , pi
g(g)
m2 < pi
t(g)
m2 and pi
g(t)
m1 > pi
t(g)
m1 :
Remark 3. Multinationals may opt for different market entry strategies: MNF1 opts for
greenfield investment and MNF2 opts to export when fl < f < fu, where fl and fu are
given by Remarks 1 and 2, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
I shall note that in Remarks 1, 2 and 3, the per-unit trade cost is given, such that
t < (a+ c) /3, so both multinational firms prefer to enter the market and produce in
equilibrium.15 Furthermore, the market is large enough to accommodate three firms
producing in equilibrium (i.e., a > 3c). Figure 2 illustrates these results for the fixed
greenfield cost f and the per-unit trade cost t ∈ [0, 1], given market size a = 1 and the
local firm’s marginal cost c = 0. In Figure 2, both firms have the following options:
greenfield investment, which is represented by the letter G, trade, which is represented
by the letter T, or staying out, which is represented by the letter O. NO ENTRY refers to
both firms staying out of the market. Clearly, prohibitive market entry costs (i.e., t > 1/2
and f > 1/9) deter both firms from entering the market. If only the per-unit trade cost is
prohibitive (t > 1/2), but the fixed greenfield cost is reduced such that 1/16 < f < 1/9, it
is optimal for only MNF1 - because the game is played sequentially - to enter the market;
MNF2 stays out of the market. Consequently, MNF1 opts for greenfield investment due
to prohibitive trade costs. Given that t > 1/2, MNF2 enters the market if (and only if)
15Depending on parameter values, further equilibria are possible, in which one multinational firm stays
out of the market. For details, see Appendix A.3.
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Figure 2 Trade vs Greenfield Investment.
the fixed greenfield cost is sufficiently low (i.e., 1/16 or less).16
Once the per-unit trade cost is reduced such that t < 1/2, if the fixed greenfield cost is
sufficiently high (f > fu), trade will be the optimal entry mode for both firms inasmuch
as it will be the only entry mode yielding positive profits (see equations (1) , (2), (3) and
Appendix A.1.1). Given the fixed greenfield cost such that 1/9 < f < fu, if the per-unit
trade cost is in the high range, such that t ∈ [11/30, 1/2], MNF1 stays out of the market
but MNF2 opts for trade. The reason is as follows: if MNF1 chooses trade, it will be
optimal for MNF2 to undertake greenfield investment, which will intensify competition
in the market and will affect MNF1’s profit negatively; since the per-unit trade cost
is relatively high, MNF1’s market entry via trade - which leads MNF2 to undertake
greenfield investment - will yield negative profits, so it is dominated by the strategy
of staying out. Similarly, if MNF1 undertakes greenfield investment, it will be optimal
for MNF2 to stay out of the market. However, given sufficiently high fixed investment
costs (1/9 < f < fu), greenfield entry will not yield non-negative profits unless the rival
16More generally, let n denote the total number of firms having already entered this market by undertak-
ing greenfield investment. Therefore, there are in total (n + 1) firms in the market (i.e., one incumbent
firm and n foreign firms, where n = 1, ..., N). In this situation, the (N + 1)
th
firm’s greenfield entry
yields positive profits if (and only if) f < (a + c)
2
/ (n + 3)
2
. Otherwise, it yields non-positive profits.
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multinational firm enters the market by exporting. Consequently, MNF1 will opt to stay
out which will lead MNF2 to enter the market by exporting so as to make positive profits.
Lastly, if all firms can make positive profits irrespective of their entry modes - if the per-
unit trade cost is sufficiently small such that t < 1/3 - both MNFs’ optimal entry modes
will be determined by Remarks (1)-(3).
3.2 Acquisition
In this section, I incorporate the acquisition decision of MNF1 into the analysis. If MNF1
acquires the local firm in the first stage, the market structure will be characterized by
Cournot duopoly. Let pi
t(a)
m2 and pi
g(a)
m2 denote MNF2’s profit when it responds to MNF1’s
acquisition decision by exporting and by undertaking greenfield investment, respectively.
Equations (5) and (6) give pi
t(a)
m2 and pi
g(a)
m2 , respectively (see Appendix A.1.4 for details):
pi
t(a)
m2 =
(
a− 2t
3
)2
, (5)
pi
g(a)
m2 =
(a
3
)2
− f. (6)
The superscript a refers to acquisition. Greenfield entry is MNF2’s best response if (and
only if) pi
g(a)
m2 > pi
t(a)
m2 . This leads to Remark 4.
Remark 4. If MNF1 acquires the local firm, then MNF2 undertakes greenfield investment
if (and only if) f < f˜ = 4t(a− t)/9. Otherwise, it exports.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4.
Remark 4 assumes that both trade and greenfield investment yield positive profits, so
MNF2 decides on the entry mode which yields the highest profit. However, if the per-
unit trade cost is prohibitive (t > a/2), MNF2 will enter the market only if f < a
2/9, such
that it can earn non-negative profits by undertaking greenfield investment; see equations
(5) and (6). If t > a/2 and f > a2/9, then MNF2 will stay out of the market.
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To acquire the local firm, MNF1 offers an acquisition price to the local firm. Let pi
a(g)
m1 and
pi
a(t)
m1 denote MNF1’s profit when it acquires the local firm and when the rival multinational
firm undertakes greenfield investment or exports, respectively. pi
a(g)
m1 and pi
a(t)
m1 are given
by equations (7) and (8), respectively (see Appendix A.1.4 for details):
pi
a(g)
m1 =
(a
3
)2
− Ω, (7)
pi
a(t)
m1 =
(
a+ t
3
)2
− Ω. (8)
Clearly, acquisition is profitable if (and only if) the acquisition price (Ω) is less than
MNF1’s operating profit. In equilibrium, MNF1 offers an acquisition price that makes the
local firm indifferent between acceptance and rejection: the acquisition price will be equal
to the local firm’s profit in the case that no acquisition takes place. Note that the local
firm’s profit given rejection is determined by the two multinational firms’ optimal entry
modes when no acquisition takes place. Let all firms produce in equilibrium, and pi
g/g
1 ,
pi
g/t
1 , and pi
t/t
1 denote the local firm’s profits when no acquisition takes place: pi
g/g
1 when
both multinational firms undertake greenfield investment; pi
g/t
1 when one multinational
firm undertakes greenfield investment and the other multinational firm exports; and pi
t/t
1
when both multinational firms export, in equilibrium. pi
g/g
1 , pi
g/t
1 , and pi
t/t
1 are given by
equations (9) , (10) and (11) , respectively (see Appendix A.1.3 for details):
pi
g/g
1 =
(
a− 3c
4
)2
, (9)
pi
g/t
1 =
(
a− 3c+ t
4
)2
, (10)
pi
t/t
1 =
(
a− 3c+ 2t
4
)2
. (11)
MNF1 acquires the local firm if the net acquisition profit, given by equation (7) or (8),
is larger than the profit it can earn by opting for the next best alternative entry mode
(either trade or greenfield investment). There are two main factors that determine the
net acquisition profit: the intensity of pre-acquisition competition and the intensity of
15
post-acquisition competition.
The intensity of pre-acquisition competition is the ensuing level of competition when no
acquisition takes place and the multinationals choose between trade and greenfield in-
vestment. It is important as it determines the acquisition price. If, for instance, the fixed
investment cost (f) is sufficiently low, such that f < fl, there will be fierce competition
in the market - provided that no acquisition takes place - as both multinational firms will
undertake greenfield investment in equilibrium. Under such a high level of competitive
pressure, the local firm’s profitability - rejection profit - will be low, and so will the ac-
quisition price; see equation (9). Similarly, if the fixed greenfield cost is sufficiently high,
such that f > fu, the level of competitive pressure will be low - provided that no acqui-
sition takes place - as both multinational firms will export in equilibrium. The higher
the per-unit trade cost - the larger the multinational firms’ efficiency loss - the lower the
level of competitive pressure on the local firm and the higher the local firm’s profitability.
In this situation, the acquisition price will be higher; see equation (11). The intensity of
pre-acquisition competition determines not only the acquisition price, but also the prof-
itability of the next best alternative entry mode. An increase in the profitability of the
next best alternative entry mode will decrease the incentives to acquire the local firm.
The intensity of post-acquisition competition determines the extent of business stealing
by the rival multinational. Post-acquisition competition is the ensuing level of compe-
tition in the market subsequent to acquisition and the rival multinational’s entry mode
choice between trade and greenfield investment. The acquisition of the local firm reduces
competition in the market, which enables the rival multinational to increase its produc-
tion and to steal business from the acquiring firm. If, for instance, the fixed investment
cost is given such that MNF2 undertakes greenfield investment subsequent to MNF1 ac-
quiring the local firm (i.e., f < f˜), then MNF2 can steal much more business from MNF1,
as it avoids the efficiency loss (the per-unit trade costs); see equations (7) and (8). Table
1 summarizes these different factors affecting the overall gain from acquisition.
As in the previous sections, I will use the same parameter space as in Bjorvatn (2004)
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to illustrate the results. Given this particular parameter space, it can be computed eas-
ily from Table 1 that, in the first case, where f < f˜ and f < fl < fu, the overall
gain from acquisition (∆) is negative if the fixed greenfield cost is sufficiently low (i.e.,
f < 1/72); therefore, MNF1 does not acquire the local firm, but undertakes greenfield
investment, followed by MNF2 undertaking greenfield investment in equilibrium (see Re-
mark 1). However, ∆ is positive if f > 1/72, which leads MNF1 to acquire the local firm,
and MNF2 to undertake greenfield investment (see Remark 4). The intuition is as fol-
lows. First, MNF2 undertakes greenfield investment, irrespective of MNF1’s entry mode
choice, so both multinational firms will eventually have the same competitive position.
Second, the business-stealing effect is large, because the acquiring firm has to compete
against a greenfield investor. Third, if the fixed investment cost is sufficiently low such
that f < 1/72, the next best alternative entry mode (greenfield investment) is sufficiently
profitable. Although the acquisition price will be low - as there will be fierce competition
between one local firm and two greenfield investors when no acquisition takes place - the
profitability of greenfield investment and the extent of business stealing sweep away all
the benefits of acquiring the local firm and competing against one less firm.
In the third case,17 where f < f˜ and fl < f < fu, ∆ is negative, so MNF1 undertakes
greenfield investment and MNF2 exports in equilibrium (see Remark 3),
18 whereas in the
fourth case, where f > f˜ and fl < f < fu, ∆ is positive, so MNF1 acquires the local firm,
and MNF2 exports in equilibrium (see Remark 4).
19 The only distinction between the
third and the fourth case is the rival multinational’s behavior. In the third case, MNF2
exports if MNF1 undertakes greenfield investment, but it undertakes greenfield invest-
ment if MNF1 acquires the local firm, as acquisition reduces competition in the market.
Therefore, MNF1 will lose its competitive advantage over MNF2 if it acquires the local
17I shall note that, given a = 1 and c = 0, the case f˜ < f < fl is not possible as f˜ = 4t(1− t)/9 > fl =
3t(2− 3t)/16 for any t. Consequently, this case is disregarded for the current parameter space.
18In this case, it is straightforward to show that fu < f˜ for t ≤ 10/37, and that fu > f˜ for t > 10/37. In
either situation, the overall gain is negative because fu is the upper limit of the fixed greenfield cost
if t ≤ 10/37, where f < fu < (1 + 9t(2 + t))/72, or f˜ is the upper limit of the fixed greenfield cost if
t > 10/37, where f < f˜ < (1 + 9t(2 + t))/72.
19In this case, the per-unit trade cost t > 10/37 as f˜ < f < fu (i.e., f˜ < fu ⇐⇒ t > 10/37). It is
straightforward to show that the lower limit of the fixed greenfield cost f˜ > (1 + t)2/72 for t > 10/37.
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firm, which will increase business stealing. However, in the fourth case, MNF2 exports,
irrespective of MNF1’s entry mode choice, so MNF1 retains its competitive advantage
even if it acquires the local firm.20 From this discussion and Figure 3, I can conclude that
Proposition 1. Unless fixed investment costs are reduced sufficiently, reductions in trade
costs are expected to increase both trade and FDI (greenfield investment or acquisition).
If the fixed greenfield cost is such that f < f˜ and fl < fu < f , then acquisition does not
take place as ∆ is negative (see the fifth case in Table 1). In this case, both the business-
stealing effect and the acquisition price are large. Consequently, both firms export in
equilibrium (see Remark 2). If, however, f > f˜ and fl < fu < f , which is the last case
in Table 1, ∆ is negative for sufficiently low levels of the per-unit trade cost (t < 1/14)
- both the business-stealing effect and the profitability of the next best alternative entry
mode (exporting) are sufficiently high - so both multinationals export in equilibrium,
whereas ∆ is positive for t > 1/14, which leads MNF1 to acquire the local firm and
MNF2 to export in equilibrium. These results are illustrated in Figure 3, where T, G, A
and O represent trade, greenfield investment, acquisition, and staying out, respectively.
NO ENTRY means that both multinationals stay out of the market. Prohibitive market
entry costs (i.e., t > 1/2 and f > 1/9) deter both multinational firms from entering the
market. In such a situation, MNF1 can still acquire the local firm and enter the market.
The local firm, however, does not accept any offer below its monopoly profit - neither firm
will enter if it rejects the acquisition offer - which is in fact the multinational’s monopoly
profit, given that all firms produce with zero marginal cost. Consequently, acquisition
yields zero profit which is exactly what a multinational firm can get by staying out of the
market. Nonetheless, a multinational firm may still want to acquire the local firm and
make zero profit in such a situation.21
20In models without competition and/or without strategic interactions between multinationals, these
cases are not present as in Bjorvatn (2004). In a simultaneous-move game, there are even cases that
no Nash equilibrium does exist, or that there exist multiple Nash equilibria. The results are available
upon request.
21If the local firm is less efficient than the foreign firm (c > 0), then MNF1’s monopoly profit will be
larger than the local firm’s monopoly profit (i.e., a2/4 > (a− c)2 /4). Therefore, the foreign firm
can make positive profits by acquiring the local firm, even when neither greenfield entry, nor trade is
profitable.
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Suppose that t > 1/2 and f > 1/9. Reducing the per-unit trade cost will lead MNF1
to acquire the local firm. If the per-unit trade cost is sufficiently high (t > 1/2), but
the fixed greenfield cost is reduced (1/16 < f < 1/9), then MNF1 undertakes greenfield
investment in equilibrium, deterring the rival from entering the market. Reducing trade
costs in such a situation will lead the other multinational to start exporting, while MNF1
will remain greenfield investor for some levels of trade costs, or will be an exporter if
trade costs are sufficiently low. Reducing trade costs further will lead MNF1 to acquire
the local firm so as to decrease competition in the market. If, however, trade costs are
substantially low, then both firms will export. This immediately leads to
Proposition 2. There is a non-linear relationship between trade and foreign investment
liberalization and FDI.
In models without competition and without strategic interactions between multinationals,
trade costs (fixed investment costs) encourage (discourage) horizontal FDI.
If the fixed investment cost is reduced further to 1/72 < f < 1/16, MNF1 acquires the
local firm and MNF2 undertakes greenfield investment; or if it is reduced to f < 1/72,
then both multinationals undertake greenfield investment. This leads to
Proposition 3. If fixed investment costs are reduced sufficiently, both multinational firms
prefer FDI, and for some low levels of fixed investment costs, firm acquisition by one
multinational, by decreasing competition in the product market, can even trigger greenfield
investment by the other multinational firm.
Although there seems to be a non-linear relationship between trade and investment lib-
eralization and FDI such that economic integration does not necessarily increase the
tendency towards FDI, it is clear from Figure 3 that reductions in fixed investment costs
in addition to trade liberalization may explain the increase in both greenfield investment
and acquisitions as compared to trade.
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4 Extensions
In this section, I examine possible extensions of the model. In particular, I discuss the
implications of allowing MNF2 to acquire the local firm. There will be slight changes
if I use the same model and the same parameter values of c and a, but allow MNF2 to
acquire the local firm when it has not been acquired by MNF1. First, I can show that if
the per-unit trade cost is given such that t < 1/3 - so all firms produce in equilibrium
- MNF2 does not want to acquire the local firm if it has not been acquired by MNF1
in the first stage, and so the results illustrated by Figure 3 for the parameter values
c = 0, a = 1 and t < 1/3 will remain the same. If the per-unit trade cost is, however,
given such that t > 1/3 - so one or both firms may stay out of the market - it may
be the case that MNF2 acquires the local firm when MNF1 stays out of the market.
Second, as I have already discussed, a substantially high per-unit trade cost (t > 1/2)
and fixed investment cost (f > 1/9) deter both multinational firms from entering the
market. In such a situation, reducing the per-unit trade cost will lead MNF1 to acquire
the local firm. If the per-unit trade cost is substantially high such that t > 1/2, but the
fixed greenfield cost is reduced such that 1/16 < f < 1/9, MNF1 undertakes greenfield
investment in equilibrium; however, MNF2 may either stay out of the market or acquire
the local firm. MNF1 undertakes greenfield investment in equilibrium as it is the only
entry mode yielding positive profits. MNF2 may want to acquire the local firm, but it
has to offer its acquisition (operating) profit to the local firm as MNF2 will stay out -
the local firm will compete against MNF1 in the duopoly market - if acquisition does not
take place. Note that MNF2’s acquisition (operating) profit is equal to the local firm’s
profit when MNF2 stays out, provided MNF1 undertakes greenfield investment and the
local firm produces with zero marginal cost. Consequently, acquisition will yield zero
profit just like staying out. Finally, if the fixed greenfield cost is sufficiently small such
that f < 1/16, then the model will generate the same results illustrated by Figure 3.
The discussion above presumes that there is no strategic delaying of the acquisition of the
local firm, and that the multinational firms move in a sequence. If the multinational firms
22
make the acquisition decisions simultaneously, then there will be a bidding contest. Such
a bidding contest model will produce the well-known Bertrand results due to the complete
information structure of the model. By contrast, if I presume that the multinational firms
move in a sequence and consider the fact that firms may want to delay strategically the
acquisition decision, a different modeling approach will be required. In a different model,
one may show that MNF1 will not acquire the local firm if it knows that MNF2 will
acquire the local firm. In this case, the ”dirty job” of creating a duopoly is done by
MNF2, and this will be anticipated by the first mover MNF1.
5 Concluding remarks
The literature on multinational firms and FDI overlooks the implications of strategic
interactions between multinationals on their market entry behavior. Despite the fact that
competition amongst multinationals is inevitable, and that they are influenced by each
other’s direct investment decisions, most studies either consider a single investor’s foreign
market entry mode choice, or look at multiple investors in a non-strategic framework.
This study, therefore, incorporates competition between multinational firms by focusing
on two multinational firms, sequentially entering the same market, and distinguishes
between multinationals’ different market entry modes. It complements Bjorvatn (2004),
and analyzes further how multinational firms choose their entry modes between trade,
greenfield investment and acquisition, and how competition amongst them affects their
optimal entry mode choices.
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Appendix A
A.1 Solution to the Cournot competition
A.1.1 One MNF and one local firm
(1) The MNF exports : Firms’ maximization problems give the following FOCs:
q1(qm1) =
(
a− qm1 − c
2
)
and qm1(q1) =
(
a− q1 − t
2
)
,
leading to the following equilibrium output levels: q∗1 = (a− 2c+ t) /3 and q∗m1 =
(a+ c− 2t) /3. Firms’ equilibrium profits are (a−2c+t)2/9 for firm 1, and (a+c−2t)2/9
for the MNF, respectively. The MNF’s trade profit is positive if (and only if) the per-unit
trade cost is sufficiently low, such that t < (a+ c) /2.
(2) The MNF undertakes greenfield investment : Firms’ maximization problems give the
following FOCs:
q1(qm1) =
(
a− qm1 − c
2
)
and qm1(q1) =
(
a− q1
2
)
,
leading to the following equilibrium output levels: q∗1 = (a− 2c) /3 and q∗m1 = (a+ c) /3.
Firms’ equilibrium profits are (a − 2c)2/9 for firm 1, and (a + c)2/9 − f for the MNF,
respectively. The MNF’s greenfield profit is positive if (and only if) the fixed greenfield
cost is less than the MNF’s operating profit, such that f < (a + c)2/9. Note that the
MNF’s greenfield profit, (a+ c)2/9−f , is more than its trade profit, (a+ c−2t)2/9 when
f < 4t(a+ c− t)/9 for t ∈ [0, (a+ c) /2] and f < (a+ c)2/9. 
A.1.2 An extension: the case of n multinational firms (no competition)
Let fmax denote the maximum value of the fixed investment cost that permits greenfield
investment as a solution. In the 2−firm case, fmax = 4t(a+ c− t)/9. I can generalize the
critical value of the fixed investment cost, fmax, to an n-firm case.
Let there be k periods and only one multinational firm entering the market in every
single period. In the first period, MNF1 first enters the market and undertakes greenfield
investment so long as f < 4(a+ c− t)/9. Note that, in the first period, there will be only
one local firm and one multinational firm competing against each other.
Suppose that (k − 2) periods have passed and (n− 2) multinational firms have success-
fully entered the market by undertaking greenfield investment, where k = n > 2. In
the (k − 1)th period, MNFn−1 chooses its entry mode between greenfield investment and
trade, and competes against the other (n− 1) firms (i.e., one local firm and (n− 2)
multinational firms). If MNFn−1 undertakes greenfield investment, it will make a profit
of
[
(a+ c)2 / (n+ 1)2 − f], where c and n represent the local firm’s marginal cost and
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the total number of active firms competing by quantities in the (k − 1)th period, respec-
tively. If MNFn−1 opts for trade, it will make a profit of (a− nt+ c)2 / (n+ 1)2, where
t represents the per-unit trade cost. Consequently, MNFn−1 prefers greenfield invest-
ment to trade - MNFn−1’s greenfield profit is more than its trade profit - if (and only if)
f < nt (2a+ 2c− nt) / (n+ 1)2.
Moreover, MNFn−1’s trade profit will be negative if t > (a+ c) /n. In such a sit-
uation, MNFn−1 will undertake greenfield investment as long as its operating profit
under greenfield investment is larger than the fixed greenfield cost such that f <
(a+ c)2 / (n+ 1)2 . Note that fmax is maximized at t = (a+ c) /n, and that fmax =
nt (2a+ 2c− nt) / (n+ 1)2 = (a+ c)2 / (n+ 1)2 for t = (a+ c) /n. Furthermore, fmax
decreases with the number of total firms in the market (i.e., ∂fmax/∂n < 0 for n > 1).
The larger is the number of firms in the market, the less likely it is that an MNF prefers
greenfield investment to trade. Finally, the local firm - the competitively disadvantaged
firm - will stay in the market and produce in equilibrium as long as a > nc, provided
that it competes against (n− 1) multinational firms that have entered the market by
undertaking greenfield investment. 
A.1.3 Two MNFs and one local firm: greenfield versus trade
Both firms have to choose their entry modes between greenfield investment and trade.
The possibilities are as follows:
(1) Both MNFs export: Firms’ maximization problems give the following FOCs:
q1(qm1, qm2) =
(
a− (qm1 + qm2)− c
2
)
,
qm1(q1, qm2) =
(
a− (q1 + qm2)− t
2
)
,
qm2(q1, qm1) =
(
a− (q1 + qm1)− t
2
)
,
leading to the following equilibrium output levels: q∗1 = (a− 3c+ 2t) /4 and q∗m1 = q∗m2 =
(a+ c− 2t) /4. Firms’ equilibrium profits are (a − 3c + 2t)2/16 for firm 1, and (a + c −
2t)2/16 for both MNF1 and MNF2.
(2) MNF 1 exports, whereas MNF 2 makes a greenfield investment: Firms’ maximization
problems give the following FOCs:
q1(qm1, qm2) =
(
a− (qm1 + qm2)− c
2
)
,
qm1(q1, qm2) =
(
a− (q1 + qm2)− t
2
)
,
qm2(q1, qm1) =
(
a− (q1 + qm1)
2
)
,
leading to the following equilibrium output levels: q∗1 = (a− 3c+ t) /4, and q∗m1 =
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(a+ c− 3t) /4 and q∗m2 = (a+ c+ t) /4. Firms’ equilibrium profits are (a − 3c + t)2/16
for firm 1, and (a+c−3t)2/16 and [(a+c+ t)2/16−f ] for MNF1 and MNF2, respectively.
As the game is symmetric, if MNF1 makes a greenfield investment and MNF2 exports,
the equilibrium profits will be [(a + c + t)2/16 − f ] and (a + c − 3t)2/16 for MNF1 and
MNF2, respectively.
(3) Both MNFs make a greenfield investment: Firms’ maximization problems give the
following FOCs:
q1(qm1, qm2) =
(
a− (qm1 + qm2)− c
2
)
,
qm1(q1, qm2) =
(
a− (q1 + qm2)
2
)
,
qm2(q1, qm1) =
(
a− (q1 + qm1)
2
)
,
leading to the following equilibrium output levels: q∗1 = (a− 3c) /4 and q∗m1 = q∗m2 =
(a+ c) /4. Firms’ equilibrium profits are (a− 3c)2/16 for firm 1, and [(a+ c)2/16− f ] for
both MNF1 and MNF2. 
A.1.4 Two MNFs and one local firm: acquisition
Let MNF1 acquire firm 1. MNF2 will either export, or will make a greenfield investment.
(4) MNF 1 acquires firm 1, whereas MNF 2 exports: Firms’ maximization problems give
the following FOCs:
qm1(qm2) =
(
a− qm2
2
)
and qm2(qm1) =
(
a− qm1 − t
2
)
,
leading to the following equilibrium output levels: q∗m1 = (a+ t) /3 and q
∗
m2 = (a− 2t) /3.
Firms’ equilibrium profits are Ω (the acquisition price) for firm 1, and [(a + t)2/9 − Ω]
and (a− 2t)2/9 for MNF1 and MNF2, respectively.
(5) MNF 1 acquires firm 1, whereas MNF 2 makes a greenfield investment: Firms’ maxi-
mization problems give the following FOCs:
qm1(qm2) =
(
a− qm2
2
)
and qm2(qm1) =
(
a− qm1
2
)
,
leading to the equilibrium output levels: q∗m1 = q
∗
m2 = a/3. Firms’ equilibrium profits are
Ω for firm 1, and (a2/9− Ω) and (a2/9− f) for MNF1 and MNF2, respectively. 
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A.2 Proof of Remarks
A.2.1 Proof of Remark 1
MNF1 prefers greenfield investment, irrespective of MNF2’s choice, if and only if pi
g(t)
m1 ≥
pi
t(t)
m1 and pi
g(g)
m1 ≥ pit(g)m1 . Solving pig(t)m1 ≥ pit(t)m1 ⇐⇒ [(a+ c+ t)2/16− f ] ≥ (a+ c− 2t)2/16
and pi
g(g)
m1 ≥ pit(g)m1 ⇐⇒ [(a + c)2/16 − f ] ≥ (a + c − 3t)2/16 for f gives two different
conditions: f ≤ 3t(2a+2c−t)/16 and f ≤ 3t(2a+2c−3t)/16, respectively. The necessary
and sufficient conditions can be reduced to only one condition: f ≤ 3t(2a + 2c− 3t)/16
as it is obvious that f ≤ 3t(2a + 2c − 3t)/16 ≤ 3t(2a + 2c − t)/16. Similarly, MNF2
prefers greenfield investment, irrespective of its rival’s choice, if and only if pi
g(t)
m2 ≥ pit(t)m2
and pi
g(g)
m2 ≥ pit(g)m2 . There is no need to show explicitly that this condition should apply to
MNF2 as pi
g(t)
m1 = pi
g(t)
m2 , pi
t(t)
m1 = pi
t(t)
m2 , pi
g(g)
m1 = pi
g(g)
m2 , and pi
t(g)
m1 = pi
t(g)
m2 (see Appendix A.1). 
A.2.2 Proof of Remark 2
MNF1 prefers trade, irrespective of MNF2’s choice, if and only if pi
g(t)
m1 ≤ pit(t)m1 and pig(g)m1 ≤
pi
t(g)
m1 . Solving pi
g(t)
m1 ≤ pit(t)m1 ⇐⇒ (a + c + t)2/16 − f ≤ (a + c − 2t)2/16 and pig(g)m1 ≤
pi
t(g)
m1 ⇐⇒ (a + c)2/16 − f ≤ (a + c − 3t)2/16 for f gives two different conditions:
f ≥ 3t(2a + 2c − t)/16 and f ≥ 3t(2a + 2c − 3t)/16, respectively. The necessary and
sufficient conditions can be reduced to the condition f ≥ 3t(2a + 2c − t)/16 as it is
obvious that f ≥ 3t(2a + 2c − t)/16 ≥ 3t(2a + 2c − 3t)/16. Similarly, MNF2 prefers
greenfield investment, irrespective of its rival’s choice, if and only if pi
g(t)
m2 ≤ pit(t)m2 and
pi
g(g)
m2 ≤ pit(g)m2 . There is no need to show explicitly that this condition should apply to
MNF2 as pi
g(t)
m1 = pi
g(t)
m2 , pi
t(t)
m1 = pi
t(t)
m2 , pi
g(g)
m1 = pi
g(g)
m2 , and pi
t(g)
m1 = pi
t(g)
m2 (see Appendix A.1). 
A.2.3 Proof of Remark 3
MNF2 prefers greenfield investment when MNF1 opts for trade if pi
g(t)
m2 ≥ pit(t)m2 . Similarly,
MNF2 prefers trade when MNF1 opts for greenfield investment if pi
g(g)
m2 ≤ pit(g)m2 . From
Appendix A.2.1 and A.2.2, pi
g(t)
m2 ≥ pit(t)m2 =⇒ f ≤ 3t(2a+2c− t)/16 and pig(g)m2 ≤ pit(g)m2 =⇒
f ≥ 3t(2a+ 2c− 3t)/16. When 3t(2a+ 2c− 3t)/16 ≤ f ≤ 3t(2a+ 2c− t)/16, MNF1 opts
for greenfield investment if pi
g(t)
m1 ≥ pit(g)m1 =⇒ f ≤ t(a + c− t)/2, which always holds for
any f ∈ [3t(2a+ 2c− 3t)/16, 3t(2a+ 2c− t)/16] as 3t(2a+ 2c− t)/16 ≤ t(a+ c− t)/2. 
A.2.4 Proof of Remark 4
MNF2 prefers greenfield investment when MNF1 acquires firm 1 if pi
g(a)
m2 ≥ pit(a)m2 . Solving
pi
g(a)
m2 ≥ pit(a)m2 ⇐⇒ a2/9− f ≥ (a− 2t)2/9 for f gives the condition f ≤ 4t(a− t)/9. 
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A.3 Entry deterrence
A higher per-unit trade cost may deter one or both multinational firms from entering
the market. For instance, given the per-unit trade cost t ∈ [(a+ c) /3, (a+ c) /2], one
firm stays out of the market unless the fixed greenfield cost is either sufficiently low
(f < (a+ c)2 /16) or sufficiently high (f > fu). Note that given the per-unit trade cost
t ∈ [(a+ c) /3, (a+ c) /2], trade will yield positive profits so long as the rival multinational
prefers either trade or staying out to greenfield investment (see equations (1) , (2), (3) and
Appendix A.1.1). If the fixed greenfield cost is sufficiently high (f > fu), trade will be
the only entry mode allowing both multinationals to make positive profits. Consequently,
both multinationals will enter the market by exporting. If, however, the fixed greenfield
cost is sufficiently low (f < (a+ c)2 /16), greenfield entry will be MNF2’s dominant
strategy. In such a situation, MNF1 will be able to make positive profits if (and only
if) it undertakes greenfield investment as well (see equation (4)). The reason is that
the per-unit trade cost is not sufficiently low, allowing MNF1 to compete against MNF2,
which will undertake greenfield investment, irrespective of MNF1’s entry mode choice.
By contrast, if the fixed greenfield cost is neither sufficiently low nor sufficiently high (i.e.,
(a+ c)2 /16 < f < fu), one multinational will not be able to enter the market. It is MNF2,
which stays out, if the fixed cost of investment is such that (a+ c)2 /16 < f < (a+ c)2 /9,
or MNF1 if the fixed cost of investment is such that (a+ c)
2 /9 < f < fu. The intuition
is as follows: (i) given the fixed greenfield cost such that (a+ c)2 /16 < f < (a+ c)2 /9,
MNF1 can deter MNF2 from entering the market by undertaking greenfield investment
as the fixed investment cost does not permit two multinational firms to enter the same
market by undertaking greenfield investment and as the per-unit trade cost does not
allow for a positive profit when the rival is undertaking greenfield investment; and (ii)
given the fixed greenfield cost such that (a+ c)2 /9 < f < fu, greenfield entry will not
bring positive profits to either multinational firm unless the rival opts for trade. However,
neither multinational makes non-negative profits by exporting unless the rival stays out
of the market. Consequently, MNF1 will stay out of the market and make zero profit,
and MNF2 will export as it will be the single firm entering the market. 
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